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Abstract
This article analyzes the history of tobacco industry funding for the AIDS response – a largely ignored aspect of private donor
involvement. Primary documents from the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library and AIDS organizations are analyzed, alongside
existing literature on the tobacco control and AIDS responses. Research on the tactics of transnational tobacco companies has
documented how they have used various charitable causes to subvert tobacco control efforts and inﬂuence public health policy. This
raises questions, which this paper seeks to answer, about if donations by tobacco companies to AIDS organizations have been used
for similar means, and if so how AIDS organizations have responded to tobacco industry overtures. Two examples illustrate how
tobacco companies initially tried to use the AIDS response to counter tobacco control measures: (1) During the 1990s, Philip Morris,
one of the largest corporate donors of the AIDS response in the USA, used its connections with AIDS organizations to create
competition for health resources, improve its reputation, and market tobacco products to the LGBT community; (2) In both Latin
America and sub-Saharan Africa, Philip Morris and British American Tobacco championed the AIDS response in order to
delegitimize efforts to develop the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. However, from the late
1990s onwards, AIDS organizations began to refuse tobacco funding and partnerships – though these policies have been not
comprehensive, as many tobacco companies still fund programs in sub-Saharan Africa. The article concludes that tobacco companies
aimed to exploit competition between health issues, and use the high-proﬁle AIDS response to improve their reputation and market
access. However, AIDS organizations, adhering to broader health goals and drawing on extensive resources and networks, were able
to shut the tobacco industry out of much of the response, though pockets of inﬂuence still exist. This demonstrates the importance of
co-operation and policy convergence across health sectors and suggests that tobacco control advocates, and other charitable sectors
that receive funding from the tobacco industry, may be able to draw lessons from the experiences of AIDS organizations.
Keywords: HIV, AIDS, donors, corporations, WHO, tobacco industry
Re´sume´
Cet article analyse l’histoire du ﬁnancement de la lutte contre le SIDA par l’industrie du tabac – un aspect de l’implication de
donateurs prive´s largement ignore´. Sont analyse´s des documents primaires provenant de la Legacy Tobacco Documents Library
(documents internes de l’industrie du tabac) et d’organismes de lutte contre le SIDA, ainsi que de la litte´rature existante sur la
lutte anti-tabac et la re´ponse au SIDA. Des recherches ante´rieures sur les tactiques des multinationales du tabac ont documente´
comment elles ont utilise´ diverses causes caritatives pour subvertir les efforts anti-tabac et inﬂuencer les politiques de sante´
publique. Cela soule`ve des questions auxquelles cet article s’efforce de re´pondre: les donations des entreprises du tabac aux
organismes de lutte contre le SIDA ont-elles e´te´ faites a` des ﬁns similaires? Dans l’afﬁrmative, comment les organismes de lutte
contre le SIDA ont-elles re´pondu aux ouvertures de l’industrie du tabac? Deux exemples montrent que des entreprises du tabac
ont initialement essaye´ d’utiliser la re´ponse au SIDA pour contrer des mesures anti-tabac : 1) Dans les anne´es 1990, Philip
Morris, l’un des plus grands donateurs pour la lutte contre le SIDA du secteur prive´, a utilise´ ses contacts avec les organismes
de lutte contre le SIDA pour cre´er de la concurrence sur les ressources pour la sante´, ame´liorer sa re´putation, et commercialiser
des produits du tabac aupre`s de la communaute´ homosexuelle; 2) En Ame´rique latine et en Afrique subsaharienne, Philip
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Morris et British American Tobacco se sont engage´s en faveur de la re´ponse au SIDA pour de´le´gitimer les efforts visant a` de´velopper
la convention-cadre de l’Organisation mondiale de la sante´ (OMS) pour la lutte anti-tabac. Toutefois, a` partir de la ﬁn des anne´es
1990, des organismes de lutte contre le SIDA ont commence´ a` refuser des ﬁnancements et partenariats lie´s au tabac – cependant ces
politiques n’ont pas e´te´ applique´es partout: de nombreuses entreprises du tabac continuent a` ﬁnancer des programmes en Afrique
subsaharienne. Cet article conclut que des entreprises du tabac ont eu pour objectif d’exploiter la concurrence entre les questions de
sante´, et d’utiliser la re´ponse au SIDA – qui be´ne´ﬁcie d’une tre`s grande visibilite´ – pour ame´liorer sa re´putation et son acce`s aux
marche´s. Ne´anmoins, les organismes de lutte contre le SIDA, en adhe´rant a` des objectifs plus larges en matie`re de sante´ et en
s’appuyant sur des ressources et re´seaux conside´rables, sont parvenus a` exclure l’industrie du tabac d’une grande partie de la
re´ponse, bien que certaines inﬂuences persistent. Cela montre l’importance de la coope´ration et de la convergence des politiques
a` travers les secteurs, et sugge`re que les de´fenseurs de la lutte contre le tabac, et d’autres secteurs caritatifs qui rec¸oivent des
ﬁnancements de l’industrie du tabac, pourraient eˆtre en mesure de tirer des lec¸ons des expe´riences d’organismes de lutte contre
le SIDA.
Mots-cle´s: SIDA, donateurs, l’indsutrie de tabac, l’Organisation mondaile de la sante´
1. Introduction
This article analyzes the history of tobacco industry funding for
the AIDS response – a largely ignored aspect of private donor
involvement. Research on private donor involvement in the
HIV/AIDS response to date has largely focused on the role of
pharmaceutical companies (Flanagan & Whiteman 2007; Lee &
Kohler 2010; Leisinger 2005), as well as the creation of public–
private partnerships to mobilize innovative ﬁnancing (Buse &
Harmer 2007; Ramiah & Reich 2006; Williams & Rushton
2011). Meanwhile, the tobacco control literature only refers to
AIDS initiatives in passing. An article on Philip Morris’ (PM)
attempts to generate legitimacy by working with health organiz-
ations refers to partnerships with AIDS Service Organizations
(ASOs), but does not speciﬁcally discuss the dynamics between
the tobacco industry and ASOs (McDaniel 2006). Drabble
(2000) documents how PM targeted lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender (LGBT) communities with donations to related
causes, but does not analyze the AIDS response in depth. Other
research (Mamudu, Hammond & Glantz 2008; Muggli & Hurt
2003; Rimmer 2005) brieﬂy refers to tobacco industry sponsor-
ship of speciﬁc AIDS events, but does not explore engagement
in the AIDS response as an ongoing strategy employed by trans-
national tobacco companies (TTCs). The literature from other
health sectors documents how TTCs have used charitable
causes to subvert tobacco control efforts (Mackenzie & Collin
2008). For example, in 1999, British American Tobacco (BAT)
sponsored the creation of the Beijing Liver Foundation for the
speciﬁc purposes of diverting government attention away from
tobacco-related illnesses (Muggli, Lee, Gan, Ebbert & Hurt
2008). This raises questions, which this paper seeks to answer,
about if donations by tobacco companies to the AIDS response
were used for similar means. Furthermore, both the tobacco
control and AIDS literature focuses on the role of tobacco compa-
nies as donors, not those organizations that are recipients of
funding, and therefore fails to consider how organizations and
charitable sectors targeted by tobacco funding respond to the
ethical dilemma of receiving resources from an industry whose
products are harmful to public health.
In order to contribute to ﬁlling these gaps in current research on
private donors to the AIDS response and AIDS organizations’
policies in regard to the tobacco industry, this article demon-
strates how TTCs initially tried to use the AIDS response to
counter tobacco control measures, and then how actors in the
AIDS response developed policies to restrict the participation of
TTCs in global health. The article ﬁnds that TTCs aimed to
exploit competition between health issues and use the high-
proﬁle AIDS response to improve their reputation and market
access. However, AIDS organizations, adhering to broader
health goals while drawing on extensive resources and networks,
were able to shut the tobacco industry out of much of the
response, though pockets of inﬂuence still exist. This demon-
strates the importance of co-operation and policy convergence
across health sectors.
In addition to contributing to the literature on AIDS funding, this
article adds to understanding of the challenges of and opportu-
nities for implementing Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (FCTC), ‘on the protection of public health
policies with respect to tobacco control from commercial and
other vested interests of the tobacco industry’ (WHO 2014).
The FCTC, introduced in 2003 and now signed by 168 states,
aims to reduce tobacco-related illness and death worldwide and
limit the inﬂuence of the tobacco industry in public health
policy. This article explores how AIDS organizations, as potential
recipients of tobacco industry funding, make use of the norms
embedded in the FCTC, contributing to its legitimacy. It suggests
that tobacco control advocates, and other charitable sectors that
receive funding from the tobacco industry, may be able to draw
lessons from the experiences of AIDS organizations.
Following a brief description of the research methodology, the
article provides two examples of tobacco industry involvement in
the AIDS response: PM’s support for the early AIDS response in
the United States (US), and PM’s and BAT’s efforts to delegitimize
the World Health Organization’s (WHO) FCTC process by
arguing that AIDS was a more important global health concern
than tobacco control. It then documents themeasuresAIDS organ-
izations took to restrict tobacco industry interference, and the
limitations on these efforts, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. It
concludes with policy implications for the AIDS response speciﬁ-
cally, and global health governance more generally.
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2. Methods
The research beganwith a review of secondary literature to identify
key processes, actors, events, and initiatives in the relationship
between organizations involved in the AIDS response and
tobacco industry. The Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, a col-
lection of around 14million industry documents that were released
following US litigation, was then searched using keywords related
to the global AIDS response including terms such as ‘National
AIDS Fund’ and ‘Global Business Coalition’. The methodology
and limitations of analyzing internal tobacco industry documents
have been discussed elsewhere (MacKenzie, Collin & Lee 2003).
Follow-up searches using a snowballing technique were conducted
to further identify relevant industry actors (such as the Tobacco
Growers’ Association of Malawi) and campaigns (such as the Vir-
ginia Slims Legends Tour) involved in AIDS-related activities.
Then, the websites of the four largest tobacco companies’ (Philip
Morris, BAT, Imperial Tobacco, and Japan Tobacco) were
searched for the terms ‘HIV’ and ‘AIDS’. Reports on corporate
social responsibility and charitable giving from these TTCs were
correspondingly searched for any mention of HIV or AIDS.
The researchers then examined documents from AIDS organiz-
ations to identify policies related to engagement with TTCs.
These queries were conducted ﬁrst by searching the sites of
those organizations mentioned in the tobacco industry docu-
ments (such as the Global Business Coalition and National
AIDS Fund), and searching well-known global AIDS organiz-
ations’ (including UNAIDS, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB
and Malaria (GFATM), and Funders’ Concerned about AIDS)
sites with the term ‘tobacco’ as well as the names of the largest
tobacco corporations. In some cases, more speciﬁc online searches
were conducted to verify reference to speciﬁc events or partner-
ships. Two authors reviewed all materials independently to
ensure that relevant data were identiﬁed, interpreted appropri-
ately and properly contextualized.
There were a number of limitations to the research. Many AIDS
organizations have not kept historic policy documents or put
them online. For example, records from some organizations,
such as the Global Business Coalition on Health (GBC) and
National AIDS Fund, from the 1990s (when both worked
closely with the tobacco industry) were not available. The restric-
tion to online searches meant that results were limited to what
documents were made public. Furthermore, it is demonstrated
that the TTCs destroyed many documents that should have
been made available on the Legacy database (MacKenzie et al.
2003). While this restricts analysis of why policies changed, exist-
ing documents present rationales that, when contextualized
within the broader AIDS and tobacco control histories, generated
a comprehensive narrative.
3. Fair play? Philip Morris’
support for the early AIDS response
in the USA
The initial response toAIDS in theUSAduring the 1980swas charac-
terized by conﬂicts between affected communities – mostly gay men
and their allies – and repressive public reactions. When infections
ﬁrst appeared among young homosexual men, homophobia com-
bined with ignorance to generate a particularly oppressive and stig-
matizing response (Fee & Krieger 1993). People Living with AIDS
(PWA) were denied health care, lost their jobs, and were evicted
from housing. Initial state action was slow and inadequate. US Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan did notmention the epidemic until 1985, and his
ﬁrst measures were to ban PWAs from entering the USA and to
promote sexual abstinence (Fee & Krieger 1993).
AIDS advocacy and self-help groups sprang up across the country
demanding more progressive policies and challenging homopho-
bic and discriminatory attitudes. The Gay Men’s Health Crisis,
founded in 1981 in New York City, was the ﬁrst formal PWA
support group, and throughout the 1980s, similar ASOs devel-
oped across the USA (Knight 2008). Membership largely con-
sisted of middle-class white males, who were well educated,
articulate, and professional. They rejected state-sponsored cam-
paigns that characterized them as statistical risk groups and as
populations of disease carriers (Fee & Krieger 1993). Instead,
they argued that the epidemic was not the result of their sexual
orientations or behaviors, but the homophobia, stigma, and dis-
crimination that forces individuals to avoid information and
medical care (Bayer & Fairchild 2006). They took to the streets,
staging ‘die-ins’ in front of government and pharmaceutical
ofﬁces and coordinating national protests.
In one such case, Act-Up, a political AIDS rights organization,
decided to boycott Philip Morris Companies Inc. (PM), in 1990,
when it found out that the TTC made donations to Senator
Jessie Helms’ campaigns for re-election (McGovern 1987), as
well as his personal charity, the Jessie Helms Center (Lewis
1989). Helms had promoted a particularly repressive response
to AIDS, such as adding the Helms Amendment to the AIDS
Appropriation Bill, which banned government funding for any
AIDS education materials that ‘promote or encourage, directly
or indirectly, homosexual activities’ (US Senate 1987, 1). Act-
Up made three demands of PM: that it stop funding Senator
Helms; that it renounce its past support for Helms; and that it
meet with Act-Up representatives to discuss PM’s corporate
responsibility to the LGBT community and AIDS response
(Act-Up 1990; Offen 2005). In response, PM justiﬁed its
donations to Helms as based on his representation of North Car-
olina, where PM ran a number of processing plants, as well as due
to his support for the tobacco industry in general (PM 1992).
Helms had opposed the increase of taxes on cigarettes, as well
as other proposals to regulate the tobacco industry (Maguire
1993). PM refused to stop supporting Helms, but did increase
funding to the AIDS response – illustrated by the temporary
rise in donations to the National AIDS Fund in 1990 as depicted
in Fig. 1. Having secured this additional funding for the AIDS
response, Act-Up called off the boycott (Offen 2005; PM 1992).
Over the next decade, PM became one of the largest corporate
donors to the National AIDS Fund. The fund had been created
in 1988 to generate resources and provide support for ASOs
and received donations from a variety of sponsors, including
the Ford Foundation and Elton John Foundation (NAF 2007).
One of the Fund’s signature projects was Positive Helpings, a
nutrition program for PWAs. Between 1996 and 2001, Positive
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Helpings distributed more than US$ 3 million from PM to food
and meals programs serving PWAs. In addition to supporting
the National AIDS Fund, PM donated to a wide range of AIDS
organizations, including the Gay Men’s Health Crisis, the
Lutheran Church and the American Foundation for AIDS
Research (PM 1995). PM framed its support to the AIDS response
as an extension of the company’s contributions to the arts, stating:
For the Philip Morris family of companies, the AIDS epidemic
of the 1980s hit close to home. Because of our support of the
arts, we became aware of the devastating loss to the arts com-
munity wrought by the spread of this disease. (PM 2000, 2)
PM also explained support for AIDS nutrition programs, such as
Positive Helpings, as an extension of Kraft’s (a food corporation
that was at the time a subsidiary of PM) programs, which prior-
itized nutrition-related charitable giving.
However, PM also hoped to use its relationships with ASOs to
foster competition for resources that were being directed toward
tobacco control. As evidence mounted regarding the harms of
smoking and second-hand smoke, the US government increased
funding to civil society organizations to conduct anti-smoking
youth education and tobacco control advocacy. PM used the net-
works it had established through its AIDS programs to contest
this support. In 1996, the company initiated a strategy entitled
‘Fair Play’, which aimed to limit the effectiveness of tobacco
control advocates. Fair Play documents reveal a proposal to
mobilize social activists, including those ﬁghting AIDS, to
compete with tobacco control groups for government funds. As
suggested by Joshua Slavitt, PM Issues Manager:
An additional option would be to identify other groups who
feel they are not receiving adequate federal or state funding
for their programs. Examples could include, public literacy
programs, AIDS research, programs to help the physically
challenged, etc . . . .This effort may lead to opportunities to
encourage groups to divert federal or state funds away from
tobacco control to other vital public programs during the
appropriations process. (Slavit 1996, 9)
PM planned to achieve this through ‘work with Corporate Contri-
butions and other internal departments to identify individuals or
organizations that can act as “emissaries” to reach out to these
groups’ (Slavit 1996). By letting AIDS and other organizations
know how much state funding was going toward tobacco
control groups, PM hoped to mobilize them to compete for
funds and critique government priorities (PM 1999).
PM also needed allies to help it counter negative publicity and
improve its corporate image. The Commissioner of the Food
and Drug Administration testiﬁed before US Congress in 1994
that, despite TTC assertions to the contrary, nicotine was
indeed a highly addictive drug in tobacco. Lawsuits against the
industry, mounted by several US states and whistleblowers, led
to the release of internal industry documents revealing how
TTCs had attempted to obscure evidence about the harms and
addictive elements of smoking. Scholarly analysis and media
reporting based on the revelations from these documents
severely damaged the reputation of the tobacco companies
(Ashley 2003). By 2000, PM’s own research indicated that it
was one of the least trusted corporations in the USA and that
a reputation management strategy was urgently needed (PM
2000).
PM used AIDS fundraising events to improve its public image.
For example, its largest AIDS fundraiser was the Virginia Slims
Legends Tours – a series of tennis tournaments and all-female
musical performances. The tour raised approximately US$ 4
million for the National AIDS Funds between 1995 and 1998
(Rosenberg & Siegel 2001). It also created opportunities for PM
to share its message about smoking and the tobacco industry.
PM provided instructions to representatives of the National
AIDS Fund on how to respond to criticism about receiving
tobacco funding. They were to state:
We’re proud of our relationship with Philip Morris U.S.A. and
Virginia Slims, and we support their belief in freedom of
choice. Philip Morris, through its diverse food, beer and
tobacco companies, has been very supportive of organizations
that are leading the ﬁght against AIDS. They were among the
ﬁrst corporations to assist in AIDS research, AIDS prevention/
education and direct care for people with AIDS. The Virginia
Slims brand has established a history of its own, through
various promotions, that have beneﬁted AIDS research over
the years. Let’s remember, AIDS does not discriminate and
neither should we. (PM 1994, 1)
The statement used phrasing that sought to unite the AIDS
response with smokers’ rights campaigns. The reference to
freedom of choice refers to PM’s frequent argument that
smokers had the right to ‘choose’ to smoke, with tobacco
control policies threatening that right (Balbach, Smith &
Malone 2005). In the context of an AIDS fundraiser, largely tar-
geted at the LGBT community, this framing also reﬂected accep-
tance of sexual choice (Stevens, Carlson & Hinman 2004).
Similarly, reference to discrimination refers to the stigma attached
to the virus, and echoes earlier campaigns by PM that smoking
regulations discriminate against people who smoke. For
example, in a press release from PM, the Vice President of Cor-
porate Affairs is quoted as arguing that businesses need to
Fig. 1. Philip Morris contributions to the National Aids Fund (Offe
1996).
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at least think before taking action that will discriminate
against a large segment of their employees [i.e. smokers],
their customers, and their vendors . . . . The time has come
when smokers will not sit passively and have their rights
trampled. (PR Newswire 1988, 1)
PM’s language around AIDS subtly mirrored pro-tobacco
messaging.
Such positive publicity also provided PMwith lucrative marketing
opportunities. Most American ASOs had strong connections to
the LGBT community, who had, and continue to have, higher
rates of smoking than the general public. A national household
survey on drug abuse in 1990 found that 35% of gay men and
38% of lesbians had smoked cigarettes in the past month com-
pared to 27% of men and 22% of women in the general sample
(Drabble 2000). Studies conducted across a range of contexts
suggest that LGBT populations have a higher smoking prevalence
than the total population (Offen, Smith & Malone 2008). Higher
smoking rates are attributed to the additional levels of reported
stress and need for acceptance or desire for rebellion among
LGBT youths. Smoking is also associated with the culture of
‘coming-out’ (Drabble 1999). As LGBT communities have been
shown to prefer brands that support LGBT-related causes, sup-
porting the AIDS response provided PM with a marketing advan-
tage among a population group with high smoking rates (Drabble
2000; Goebel 1994).
Noting the speciﬁc characteristics of the LGBT market, PM not
only targeted LGBT smokers in traditional marketing campaigns,
but it also used AIDS initiatives to develop positive brand recog-
nition (Smith & Malone 2003). Between 1998 and 2002, PM paid
for advertisements in Out Magazine that listed the top ten ‘Com-
panies That Care’ about LGBT community causes (Stevens et al.
2004). The 2002 advertisement put PM in the top spot and cele-
brated PM’s US$ 14 million in donations to AIDS-related organ-
izations (Out Magazine 2002). In 2002, PM ran a similar
advertisement in PRIDE.02, ‘the Magazine for Gay Pride in the
USA’, which noted that PM was one of the largest corporate con-
tributors to the ﬁght against AIDS. Such publicity presented PM
as an ally in the AIDS response, seeking to generate a favorable
reputation, and, therefore, market share, within the LGBT com-
munity (Stevens et al. 2004).
During the 1990s, ASOs were initially grateful for PM’s support
(Drabble 2000). In 1990, federal US funding for AIDS programs
was just US$ 3.1 billion, which was grossly inadequate
(Summers & Kates 2004). Most ASOs depended on donations
from private individuals, churches, and charities to keep their
doors open (Fee 1994). Tobacco industry funding was the
largest corporate grant for many American ASOs. Furthermore,
tobacco funding provided more ﬂexibility than government and
foundation grants, allowing ASOs to design programs as they
saw ﬁt, and tobacco grants had substantially fewer reporting
requirements. Grants from PM could be used for capital and
administrative expenses, which was not typical of other corporate
or foundation funding (Stone & Siegel 2004). For example, PM
provided money for general operating costs to the National
Women and AIDS Project and Philadelphia Sciences Institute
(PM 1995). In return, the AIDS response provided PM with
opportunities to divert attention and resources away from
tobacco control, and to enhance its market position and
messaging.
4. Targeting WHO’s ‘blind spots’:
TTCs use of AIDS as a diversion
from global tobacco control
By the early 1990s, awareness was increasing of growing AIDS
epidemics in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). In par-
ticular, a generalized epidemic (as opposed to epidemics con-
tained amongst speciﬁc population groups as was the case in
most high-income countries) was emerging in sub-Saharan
Africa. In South Africa, HIV prevalence among pregnant
women climbed from less than 5% of the population in 1990 to
nearly 30% in 1997 (UNAIDS 1998). As treatments for those
infected, and to prevent HIV transmission from mothers to
infants, was not yet available in LMICs, due to the high cost
and lack of health resources, increasing HIV infections were fol-
lowed by mortality, orphaning and further devastating social
impacts (Poku 2006). AIDS epidemics in LMICs outside of sub-
Saharan Africa were less severe but still caused widespread
concern. AIDS rates in the Caribbean (1.82%) and South and
South East Asia (0.61%) were lower than in sub-Saharan Africa
(7.4%) but higher than in North America (0.55%) and Western
Europe (0.23%). As a result, there were predictions of burgeoning
generalized epidemics in LMICs and calls for a global response
(Pisani 2008; UNAIDS 1998). Consequently, both the amount
of funding for AIDS and number of organizations addressing
the epidemic rapidly increased. Contributions from donor
countries for the AIDS response rose from US$ 90 million in
1990 to US$ 1359 million in 2000 (Knight 2008). In 1996, the
United Nations Joint Program on AIDS (UNAIDS) was formed,
and by the turn of the millennium, discussions were underway
to create innovative ﬁnancing mechanisms for the AIDS response.
Much less attention was paid to the increasingly globalized use of
tobacco products (Callard 2010). As countries in North America
and Western Europe implemented tobacco control measures and
education activities, throughout the 1990s, smoking rates in what
had been the largest markets for TTCs began to decline. Con-
sumption in the USA fell from approximately 750,000 cigarettes
in 1981 to less than 500,000 in 2001 (WHO 2008). In response,
TTCs’ shifted their focus to emerging markets in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America, where there were weaker regulations,
growing populations, and rising incomes (Lee 2014). Initially,
TTCs faced few barriers in restructuring their operations
toward this globally oriented strategy. Tobacco control was still
seen as primarily a domestic concern. The WHO Tobacco and
Health Unit, located under the Substance Abuse Program, col-
lected and aggregated available data on tobacco use and its
health consequences in members states, but was unable to do
much else as it had only a handful of staff and a limited budget
(Lee 2014). Meanwhile, domestic governments in LMICs were
not overly concerned about increasing tobacco use. Though
tobacco use was increasing in LMICs, the relatively delayed
impacts of smoking (tobacco-related illnesses often do not
appear until decades after habits begin) meant that tobacco use
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did not present an imminent health threat (WHO 2014). As many
LMICs faced numerous health challenges related to lack of public
health resources, and widespread poverty and infectious disease,
tobacco control was not considered an urgent priority. As a
result, TTCs were able to mitigate losses due to market contrac-
tion in high-income countries by increasing sales in LMICs.
To create awareness about the growing disease burden from
tobacco use in LMICs, public health advocates began organizing
international events and campaigns. The 8th World Conference
on Tobacco or Health (WCTOH), held in Buenos Aires in
1992, was the ﬁrst tobacco conference held in an LMIC. The con-
ference was described by Muggli et al. as ‘a signiﬁcant moment in
globalizing tobacco control’, because it was the ﬁrst meeting to
concentrate on the dangers of second-hand smoke and the
effects of tobacco use in LMICs (2008, 2). Conference organizers
advocated the introduction of tobacco control measures in LMICs
comparable to those adopted in high-income countries.
Fearful of how such policies might impact its market expansion in
LMICs, BAT devised a planned to create a distraction from the
WCTOH. Jorge R. Basso Dastugue, a representative from
Nobleza-Piccardo, BAT’s subsidiary in Argentina, proposed a
strategy to counter the WCTOH by capitalizing on the growing
concern about AIDS:
Being the disease of the century and a preventive disease,
AIDS should be ‘public enemy No. 1’ because of its terminal
consequences at every age. Facing the [sic] AIDS increasing
importance in the world and in Argentina we believe this
disease to be the sole matter cable [capable] [sic] of eclipsing
the [WCTOH] Conference. (Dastugue 1992, 3)
One of Dastugue’s strategy documents, entitled Proposed Possible
Action To Take Against [the WCTOH], suggested, ‘have groups
ﬁghting against AIDS claim this conference for their priority as
compared to tobacco’ (Dastugue 1992, 3). Documents described
plans to generate competition for media and policy attention by
sponsoring AIDS publicity events at the same time as the confer-
ence. Plans were proposed to bring in a ‘world known medical
doctor’ to divert press attention, and to have publicity ﬁlms on
AIDS projected on large screens in different areas of the city at
the same time as the WCTOH. To avoid questions about the
timing of such campaigns, these promotions would not identify
BAT as the sponsor. Instead, BAT funding would be channeled
through a local AIDS foundation (Dastugue 1992).
While it appears that not all planned activities were carried out,
BAT did sponsor music concerts and soccer matches promoting
AIDS awareness in Argentina at the same time as the WCTOH
(Muggli & Hurt 2003). The ‘world known doctor’, mentioned in
Dastugue’s plan may have been Luc Montagnier, one of the disco-
verers of HIV, who visited Argentina at the same time as the
WCTOH. The Buenos Aires newspaper, La Penza (1992),
reported on Montanger’s visit, which coincided with the launch
of the second phase of the National Program on AIDS by the
Argentina Ministry of Health and Social Action. Such events ful-
ﬁlled BAT’s goal of creating competition between AIDS and
tobacco control for media and political attention.
Despite such efforts by TTCs to subvert tobacco control efforts,
WHO continued to promote the idea of a global convention on
tobacco control. At the World Health Assembly (WHA) in
1992, the concept of an international legal instrument for
tobacco control was put forward (Roemer, Taylor & Lariviere
2005). In 1995, WHO member states adopted WHA Resolution
48.11 calling for ‘an international strategy for tobacco control’,
including the adoption of this international instrument. In
1996, Resolution 49.17 was adopted at the WHA, calling on all
parties to fast track negotiations of the FCTC. In 1998, WHO
Director-General Gro Harlem Brundtland made global tobacco
control one of two cabinet-level priorities and negotiations on
the WHO FCTC commenced in 1999 (Lee 2014).
Alongside these developments, BAT maintained the message
advanced previously in Argentina – that global health co-oper-
ation should prioritize AIDS, not tobacco control. In a document
entitled, The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control:
Our view, BAT argued that the convention:
Would impose an additional burden on many governments,
which have already determined their own domestic policy
needs. There are likely to be serious resource implications
for many national governments, particularly in developing
countries, which have already committed stretched resources
to health policy matters they consider higher priority, such
as HIV. (BAT 2000, 2)
This messaging sought to discredit the WHO by questioning if its
priorities aligned with those of LMICs. While AIDS was a growing
concern in LMICs, as outlined above, in most countries outside of
sub-Saharan Africa, there were arguably more pressing health
matters as the majority of child and adult deaths continued to
be caused by non-communicable diseases, many of which were
related to the growing use of tobacco products, such as lower res-
piratory infections (WHO 2003). However, BAT capitalized on
the growing panic around AIDS, to question WHO’s priorities
and argue it neglected LMICs needs.
An important ally of this strategy was the industry front group
the International Tobacco Growers Alliance (ITGA). Established
in 1984 by the tobacco industry, the ITGA was a global agricul-
tural lobby group on tobacco farming issues (Tobacco Tactics
2014). While presenting itself as an independent collective of
tobacco farmers, the ITGA received substantial funding from
TTCs to create resistance to tobacco control efforts (Rimmer
2005). In the late 1990s, BAT developed a plan to work with
ITGA members in LMICs to lobby the WHO to direct greater
attention to AIDS. A 1998 document outlines a strategy to,
‘Target WHO’s blind spots on key primary health priorities,
such as AIDS prevention and malaria. Working through
African and Latin American members, ITGA will build actions
with their governments to put pressure on WHO’ (ITGA 1998,
4). To advance this strategy, ITGA members participated in
AIDS-related events and championed the need for greater
AIDS resources from the WHO. Shabanji Opukah, BAT’s Head
of International Development Issues, wrote in an email that the
ITGA Executive Director called him to report on the outcomes
of a Southern African regional meeting:
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The ITGA agreed to support fully a proposal for a pan-African
aids conference to be held in Zambia in September hosted by
the health ministry at which they will discuss the aids scourge
in Africa. The ITGA is going to present what their grower
associations have been doing to support government and
NGO efforts in combating AIDS in Africa and through that
highlight the importance of tobacco to the economy whilst
relegating it as an issues [sic] in the health priorities of
these countries. Then [sic] idea is to use the forum to challenge
and ridicule the WHO convention. (Opukah 1999, 1)
By highlighting AIDS, the ITGA aimed to suggest that while the
tobacco industry was addressing the epidemic and supporting
the local economy, WHO priorities were misplaced, and the
FCTC would not beneﬁt LMICs.
To further propagate this message, in 1999, BAT paid for repre-
sentatives from the ITGA to meet with representatives from the
WHO regarding the FCTC (Opukah 1999, 1). An article about
the meeting was published in the industry-sponsored Tobacco
Journal. It quoted the ITGA President, Richard Tate, as noting
that while the ITGA disagreed with WHO over tobacco control,
it encouraged it to increase its commitments to addressing
AIDS and Malaria: ‘Many of our members are from developing
countries and know the suffering and distresses caused by both
diseases. This is the type of fundamental public health campaign
that we applaud’ (Hallmark 1999, 1). Another article on the
meeting celebrated BAT’s contributions to the AIDS response
in Southern Africa: ‘In Zimbabwe, for example, tobacco farmers
have set up one of the most extensive AIDS prevention programs
in rural areas. Without their action, there would have been few
resources available to combat this terrible scourge’ (PR Newswire
1999, 1). This messaging showcased the contributions of the
tobacco industry to the AIDS response, at the same time as
suggesting WHO was not doing enough to address the epidemic
because it was preoccupied with tobacco control.
The ITGA also championed AIDS at tobacco control-related
events. In 2000, PM paid for ITGA representatives from Malawi
to attend a UN Economic and Social Council meeting on the
FCTC. The Malawian delegates listed their goal in attending the
meeting as to get the WHO to ‘reassess importance of tobacco
growing for developing countries; put health priorities on real
world basis, and go public where good work is taking place’
(ITGA Malawi 2000, 2). The concept of reﬁning health priorities
‘on a real world basis’ reiterated the message that tobacco control
was a concern primarily in high-income countries, while LMICs
suffered from other health concerns, such as AIDS, which
should be prioritized by WHO because of these countries’ relative
reliance on external assistance to address public health needs. The
delegates reported to PM that they had advised the Malawian gov-
ernment representatives to present a similar message. Indeed the
government of Malawi’s subsequent statement on the FCTC,
which was included in communications between the ITGA and
PM as evidence of inﬂuence, expressed the belief ‘that the
deaths due to Tobacco, for example, in Malawi are exaggerated,
ignoring more important problems of Malaria and H.I.V. Aids’
(quoted in ITGA Malawi 2000, 4). PM and BAT used networks
with AIDS organizations and the ITGA to foster a discourse
that capitalized on growing concerns about the AIDS epidemic
at the expense of tobacco control.
5. ‘A pact with the devil’:
restricting TTC’s corporate social
responsibility opportunities
As evidence emerged on the higher smoking rates among LGBT
populations in the USA (as outlined above), AIDS organizations
began questioning the motivations behind tobacco industry
funding. The Coalition of Lavender Americans on Smoking and
Health was supported by the Center for Disease Control, in
1996, to organize a conference, ‘Alive With Pleasure!’, which
focused on the prevention of tobacco use and alcohol problems
in the LGBT communities. The Coalition met with LGBT and
AIDS organizations to discuss the health impacts of smoking
and suspect practices of TTCs (Drabble 1999). Their concerns
were augmented by research showing that smoking was particu-
larly harmful to PWAs and could impede treatment effectiveness
(Furber, Maheswaran, Newell & Carroll 2006). The ﬁndings
created a link between anti-smoking campaigns and AIDS
health care. Rather than constructing a choice between tobacco
control or AIDS, both issues were recognized as relevant health
issues for ASOs and LGBT groups.
In response to growing awareness of smoking-related diseases
within the AIDS community, as well as wider public attention to
the public relations tactics of tobacco companies, many ASOs,
and LGBT organizations demanded that their boards refuse
tobacco-related funding. As early as 1991, a leader of Act-Up
San Francisco argued in an editorial, published in the Gay Com-
munity News, that receiving funding from PM, ‘represents us
taking money from walking over the bodies of those killed by ciga-
rettes . . . I would characterize this as a pact with the devil’ (as cited
in Offen, Smith & Malone 2003, 205). By the late 1990s, such
opinions had become widespread with the Coalition of Lavender
Americans on Smoking and Health arguing, ‘We gay adults have
a responsibility to start treating tobacco as a serious threat to
our community. It’s not some minor concern to be ignored
while we focus on AIDS and breast cancer’ (Drabble 1999, 8). In
1998 and 1999, the Coalition produced ‘The Ethics of Tobacco,
Alcohol, & Pharmaceutical Funding: A Practical Guide for
LGBT Organizations’, which advised against accepting tobacco
funding, arguing that it was a harmful form of indirect marketing.
The Coalition encouraged ASOs to develop guidelines on what
type of corporate funding they welcomed, and under what con-
ditions. The Gay and Lesbian Medical Association developed, in
1998, one of the ﬁrst such policies, stating that: ‘The Gay and
Lesbian Medical Association will not accept direct funding from
alcohol or tobacco manufacturers or distributors’ (quoted in
Drabble 2000, 3). While not all AIDS-related organizations
made the choice to refuse TTC funding, it became increasingly
common. A survey of ASOs in the USA found that the most
common reason for refusing TTC funding was recognition that
accepting tobacco money conﬂicted with organizational mandates
related to improving population health, and due to concerns about
public association between the organization and tobacco corpor-
ations – due to TTC’s increasingly poor reputation (Stone &
Siegel 2004). By linking health issues, ASOs recognized that
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tobacco control initiatives were not in competition with AIDS pro-
grams, as TTCs had suggested but had similar overall health goals,
which TTCs threatened.
It is notable that many ASOs adopted policies against receiving
tobacco funding relatively early, compared to other charitable
sectors; in developing such early policies, ASOs were earlier iden-
tiﬁers of the ethical issues raised by partnerships with TTCs. ASOs
were able to demonstrate leadership regarding the ethics of
accepting TTC funding for three reasons. First, as noted above,
ASOs began to recognize that the holistic well-being of PWAs
required consideration of health issues beyond those speciﬁcally
related to the virus. Secondly, AIDS organizations beneﬁted
from an extensive global network of both grassroots organizations
and global institutions that helped to disseminate concerns about
the tobacco industry and resulting policies. Finally, by the late
1990s, resources for AIDS were increasing, rising from US$ 292
million spent globally in 1996 to US$ 4630 million in 2003
(Knight 2008). Therefore, ASOs had access to more resources
and greater ﬂexibility around with whom they could partner.
Rejection of tobacco funding trickled up from ASOs and partner
organizations to global forums. During a 2002 retreat to establish
the private sector delegation to the GFATM Board, it was agreed
that TTCs should not be allowed to be members. Meeting minutes
from the retreat note ‘there are certain industry sectors that could
create conﬂict, such as tobacco industry representatives’ (GFATM
2002, 2). In 2009, the GFATM formalized and expanded this
policy, passing a board resolution that prohibited the fund from
receiving donations or working in partnerships with TTCs
(GFATM 2010). UNAIDS developed ‘Guidelines on Working in
Partnership with the Private Sector’, which recommend ‘not
developing partnerships with entities in sensitive sectors such as
tobacco, gambling, and pornography’ (2007, 1). This stance was
reiterated in a 2013 UNAIDS Lancet Commission Discussion
paper on ‘How Should the Global Health and AIDS Architecture
Be Modernized for the Post-2015 Development Agenda?’ which
noted the growing role of TTCs in LMICs, and the need to
protect against this inﬂuence. It reads, ‘Public health goals,
however, need to be safeguarded against private sector strategies,
such as the efforts of tobacco companies to enlarge their markets
in low- and middle-income countries’ (2013, 7). AIDS organiz-
ations were some of the ﬁrst to advance policies against TTC
interference in global health forums.
In 2011, theGBC decided to prohibit membership to parties with
connections to the tobacco industry. It released a statement that
read, ‘The membership of tobacco companies and their parent
companies in the Coalition would be inconsistent with, and
would contradict GBC’s mission and vision.’ This was signiﬁcant
as both PM and BAT had been longtime members of the
Coalition. The Coalition developed this policy the same year it
changed its name from the ‘Global Business Coalition on AIDS,
TB, and Malaria’ to ‘Global Business Coalition on Health’. As
the organization widened its focus to broader health goals, the
divisions between health issues such as AIDS and tobacco-
related illnesses blurred. It became intolerable for a health
coalition to include members who proﬁted from products that
contributed to one of the most pressing global health crisis.
The GBC also noted that it had made the decision to restrict
tobacco industry membership in order to align its policies with
those of the WHO’s FCTC, which strictly limited interactions
and partnerships with the tobacco industry. The FCTC, signed
by 168 states in 2003, included Article 5.3 on ‘the protection of
public health policies with respect to tobacco control from com-
mercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry’,
which recommended parties, ‘denormalize and, to the extent
possible, regulate activities described as “socially responsible” by
the tobacco industry, including but not limited to activities
described as “corporate social responsibility”’. Although the
FCTC, as an intergovernmental treaty, was only binding for sig-
natory states, measures regarding industry inﬂuence were
adopted by non-state actors, including AIDS organizations, as
justiﬁcation for terminating partnerships with TTCs. The legiti-
macy of the convention, in turn, was strengthened by compliance
of these organizations. Instead of AIDS distracting from the
FCTC, as TTCs had hoped, the FCTC increased awareness
among AIDS organizations about the need to limit TTC engage-
ment and provided a framework through which to do so.
Concurrently, a number of prominent funders developed suppor-
tive policies to limit TTC involvement in global health. The Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation, one of the largest private
donors in the global health ﬁeld, established a policy of not pro-
viding funding to organizations that accepted resources from or
had connections with the tobacco industry (BMGF 2010). As
the Gates Foundation also funded tobacco control initiatives, it
noted that accepting funding from or working in partnership
with organizations with links to the tobacco industry would be
hypocritical to broader global health goals. In 2010, the foun-
dation pulled funding from the International Research and Devel-
opment Center (IDRC) – a research institute in Canada that
supports organizations in LMICs to implement both AIDS and
tobacco control programs – when it found out the Executive
Director was also on the Board of Imperial Tobacco Canada.
The Gates statement read:
The foundation was recently informed that the chair of the
board of our partners, the International Development
Research Centre (IDRC), has until recently also been a Direc-
tor of Imperial Tobacco Canada, Ltd. We are deeply disap-
pointed by this revelation and feel this conﬂict is
unacceptable as we work to support meaningful tobacco
control programs in Africa. (BMGF 2010, 1)
This case, which was widely covered in the media, propagated the
message that in order to access Gates resources, organizations
needed to sever all ties with the tobacco industry (see, e.g., Black-
well 2010; Market Wire 2010). As the largest private donor to the
global AIDS response, donating US$ 2.5 billion to AIDS programs
in 2014, the Gates Foundation dwarfed TTC funding and could
set the terms of partnerships for AIDS-related organizations.
The widespread rejection of tobacco money by civil society organ-
izations, institutions, and other private actors in the AIDS
response disseminated through global networks. Imperial
Tobacco reported dismay, in 2005, when a West African charity
it had historically provided funding to for AIDS programs
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refused its money. The TTC wrote in its Social Responsibility
Report:
Our efforts for further and more widespread action on AIDS
have been impeded by the difﬁculty of ﬁnding a suitable
partner to help us. We were saddened that the head ofﬁce of
an international NGO prevented their regional ofﬁce from
partnering us in several developing countries, solely on the
grounds of accepting money from a tobacco company. (Imper-
ial Tobacco 2005, 1)
Overall, by the late 1990s onwards, AIDS organization in the USA
and then globally turned away from tobacco funding. This was
initially prompted by evidence of the harmful health effects of
tobacco use on PWAs but eventually was motivated by recognition
of TTCs’ use of the AIDS response to further its interest, and sup-
ported by the development of shared norms and greater resources.
AIDS organizations were early recognizers of the ethical problems
of partnerships with TTCs. Their stance in turn proved supportive
of the FCTC process and adoption of measures limiting industry
inﬂuence in health programs and policy.
6. TTCs and AIDS in sub-Saharan
Africa
However, TTCs have not been completely shut out of the AIDS
response. By 2007, Imperial Tobacco had found another AIDS
organization – a French charity called Cinomade – to support
in Cote d’Ivore, and continues to fund AIDS programs in sub-
Saharan Africa (Imperial Tobacco 2007). BAT sponsors AIDS
programs in Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa (ASH 2007; BAT
2014). Japan Tobacco funds AIDS programs in South Africa
and Tanzania (Japan Tobacco 2013), and Philip Morris gives
extensively to AIDS projects in South Africa (PM 2010, 2011).
TTCs have continued to be active supporters of the AIDS
response in sub-Saharan Africa, despite resistance from some
AIDS organizations and global policies discouraging such part-
nerships, for two reasons. First, the needs of AIDS initiatives in
sub-Saharan Africa remain greater than available resources.
Global funding for the AIDS response is projected to be $21.7
billion by the end of 2015, still short of the $22 to $24 billion
required to fund programs in LMICs (UNAIDS 2014). As a
result of stagnated global health resources and continued insufﬁ-
cient domestic resources, many AIDS organizations remain des-
perate for funding (UNAIDS 2014). Secondly, many sub-
Saharan African governments have not adopted comprehensive
policies to restrict TTC inﬂuence. Some states, like Malawi and
Zambia, have not signed and ratiﬁed the FCTC. Others, such as
South Africa and Kenya, while imposing regulations on tobacco
product advertising and marketing, do not regulate tobacco
industry corporate social responsibility activities (ASH 2007).
The combination of dire need and relatively weak regulations in
many sub-Saharan African countries allows TTCs to continue
to capitalize on the AIDS response.
TTCs continue to use AIDS projects to improve their image and
reputation in sub-Saharan Africa and have even been celebrated
for their contribution to the African AIDS response. In 2007,
BAT sponsored an African–Middle East Conference on AIDS.
At the conference, the Nigerian Minister of Labor praised
BAT’s national workforce policy on AIDS and called on other
businesses to implement similar policies (John 2007). Similarly,
the Tanzanian Cigarette Company (a subsidiary of Japan
Tobacco International) received a ‘Best Employer’ award in
2010, for AIDS and related programs for workers’ health. With
no recognition of the contradiction of giving a tobacco
company a health-related award, Japan Tobacco was commended
by the Minister of Defense and National Security, and the Minis-
ter of Labor, Youth and Employment (Bitekeye 2010). It can be
argued that such events are contrary to Article 5.3 of the FCTC,
which both Nigeria and Tanzania have ratiﬁed because they
create venues for government ofﬁcials and TTC representatives
to interact, failing to ‘de-normalize’ relationships between the
government and tobacco industry (a recommendation under
Article 5.3). TTCs use such events and awards to enhance their
reputation as corporate citizens and to indirectly promote
tobacco products despite advertising bans.
The continued participation of TTCs in the sub-Saharan African
AIDS response demonstrates that efforts to shut tobacco money
and inﬂuence out have not been comprehensive. TTCs have redir-
ected their resources where the AIDS response remains desperate
for funding and where government tobacco control policies are
weak. While TTCs claim to be supporting the AIDS response in
sub-Saharan Africa because of the dire need, and out of the
desire to ensure the health of their employees, their past practices
of using the AIDS response to subvert tobacco control efforts and
market their products raise questions about the motivations
behind their current AIDS programs.
Such questions are especially pertinent as rates of tobacco use are
on the rise in many sub-Saharan African countries. Cigarette con-
sumption on the continent almost doubled from just over 40
billion in 1990 to nearly 80 billion in 2010 (Blecher & Ross
2011). A greater portion (9%) of boys smoke than in other devel-
oping regions, such as South East Asia, and a greater portion of
youth (both boys and girls) smoke compared to adults in sub-
Saharan Africa, indicating that smoking prevalence is likely to
increase over the next decade (Blecher & Ross 2011). Such
trends suggest that tobacco control efforts remain essential to pre-
venting greater tobacco-related illness and death in a region
already struggling to address numerous other health challenges.
7. Conclusion
During the early AIDS response in the USA, PM provided
funding to ASOs to support marketing campaigns targeted
toward LGBT communities, to enhance the company’s reputation
during a time of declining public trust of TTCs, and to support
arguments for the diversion of resources from tobacco control
initiatives. TTCs then applied a similar strategy at the global
level as the FCTC process progressed. TTCs capitalized on
growing concerns about the AIDS epidemic in LMICs –
markets they were also expanding into – to argue that WHO
should focus on AIDS, not tobacco control. TTCs aimed to gen-
erate competition between the two health issues, for resources and
policy attention, to protect their interests from stronger
regulation.
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However, the collective decision by many AIDS organizations to
refuse TTC funding, and thus the use of the AIDS epidemic to the
tobacco industry’s advantage, demonstrates the capacity of health
networks to restrict negative or co-opting inﬂuences through
closer co-operation. ASOs used knowledge, of the harms of
smoking for PWAs and the suspect practices of TTCs, to justify
the termination of partnerships with TTCs. Through global net-
works and the creation of common policies, AIDS organizations
thus pioneered practices that restricted the ability of TTCs to
exert undue inﬂuence over global health policy. These actions
by ASOs were supported by the availability of alternative
funding sources and an agreed global governance instrument.
The FCTC, while not binding on non-state actors, provided a
set of shared norms which informed the actions of the AIDS com-
munity. Where the gap between resources for AIDS and health
needs remains wide, and tobacco control policies are still rela-
tively weak, however, TTCs remain actively involved in the
AIDS response. In sub-Saharan Africa, notably, government min-
isters and TTC representatives still share the same podiums to
congratulate each other on their AIDS efforts.
Evidence of tobacco industry involvement in the AIDS response
raises a number of policy implications for both the AIDS and
tobacco control communities, as well as broader concerns regard-
ing the strengthening of global health governance. First, it should
be recognized that competition among health issues can be sown
and exploited by vested interests for reasons that run contrary to
public health goals. TTCs used the AIDS epidemic to try to divert
resources and attention away from tobacco control. Priority
setting and the allocation of scarce resources should be under-
taken according to evidence-based criteria and transparent pro-
cesses. Moreover, there is a need for more collaborative, rather
than competitive, approaches to increase societal resources for
health needs overall.
Second, other public interest organizations can learn from, and
build upon, the policies prohibiting funding from TTCs pioneered
by AIDS organizations. TTCs continue to offer donations to a
diverse range of charitable organizations concerned, for
example, with the environment, domestic violence, poverty alle-
viation, arts, sports, and education (BAT 2014; PM 2010).
These donations provide TTCs with a degree of legitimacy and
reputational rehabilitation, while providing nontransparent
means for interacting with policy-makers. The recipients of
such funding need to be aware of the impact of TTC activities
on public interests, industry tactics in seeking to inﬂuence
public policy, and the consistency of these efforts with their
own mandates and normative frameworks. Public interest organ-
izations might look to AIDS organizations for best practices
regarding ethical partnerships. Further research is needed on
the extension of these best practices to minimize inconsistencies
in practice across public health issue areas.
Third, solidarity across health issues requires mutually supportive
approaches embedded in global governance arrangements. In this
case, AIDS organizations adopted Article 5.3 of the FCTC which
calls for the exclusion of tobacco industry participation in policy-
making. AIDS organizations were able to review their own prac-
tices around TTC funding because they had a shared normative
framework to draw from. Conversely, tobacco control efforts
should recognize the particular needs of PWAs. As AIDS organ-
izations have broadened their mandates, such as the Global
Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS becoming the Global Business
Coalition for Health, there is an even greater need for policy
coherence.
Finally, to better enable AIDS organizations to choose not to
accept TTC funding requires access to alternative resources.
TTC funding for the AIDS response, notably in resource-scarce
settings such as sub-Saharan Africa, requires replacement by
other donors. Their funding could be provided with the condition
of compliance with Article 5.3 to ensure that the needs of those
affected by HIV/AIDS are not met at the expense of furthering
the health-harming activities of TTCs. Such coordination would
beneﬁt the AIDS response, tobacco control initiatives and, most
importantly, those individuals and communities worldwide
affected by either major cause of ill-health and death.
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